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Competing visions of violence in Colombia

Written by Miguel Juste Hernández
Thursday, 19 February 2009 00:00

The Democratic Security Policy set out by President Uribe has constructed the idea of Colombia being a democratic state seriously threatened mainly by organised terrorism (FARC and other guerrillas) and drug trafficking. For the ruling government, it is the duty of the state to fight these issues using every means of power. This approach to the conflict has also prevailed in international news coverage. However, this perspective is widely controversial within Colombian society. Other actors and factors, including the action of the state, are considered by the growing opposition to Uribe’s government.

The first decade of the new century in Colombia will probably be remembered as the Democratic Security era. These two words, necessarily linked to the personality of President Álvaro Uribe Vélez, name the security strategy of the ruling government which is its unquestionable priority.

The strategy is based on the idea that Colombia is a democratic state threatened by the terrorism of guerrillas and drug trafficking, just like other Western and democratic countries are. It is the duty of the government to recover the control of the whole territory and fight using every means to eradicate the groups threatening collective security, especially the most powerful enemy of the state: FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia).

The long and deep negotiations with FARC lead by former President Andrés Pastrana didn’t reach an agreement and might even have strengthened the guerrilla, which had at that moment more than 16,000 guerrilleros, the effective control of large areas in the countryside and an impressive organisation capable of the most terrible attacks. Many analysts believe that those negotiations showed that guerrillas’ main interests are associated with drug trafficking and extortion rather than with its political principles. In that context, the time to talk seemed to be over. Uribe was elected by a broad majority in 2002 with the slogan: “Firm hand, big heart”, claming a harsher treatment of FARC and the other extreme left guerrillas. Strengthening the military power was then considered the main, or even only, effective means for recovering the control of the whole territory and bringing safety to the people during the bloody situation in Colombia.

The attacks of 9/11 encouraged the Democratic Security at an international level. Before that date, violence in Colombia was distrustfully regarded by the international community as a complex phenomenon that included other factors like a general atmosphere of corruption caused by extensive drug trafficking, human rights violations and paramilitaries. On the other hand, in the years following 2001, FARC became internationally considered as the main enemy of the country and was integrated in the optics and strategies of the Global War on Terror. Thus, Uribe’s heavy security programme was strongly supported by the US Government by means of “Plan Colombia” which included development aid and military support.

An important part of Colombian society strongly supports the Democratic Security Strategy, especially in the biggest cities of the country. Trust in Uribe has even increased with some of the government’s success over the last seven years. FARC are seriously weakened: More than 7,000 guerrilleros are reckoned to have abandoned their activities, which means that they have been killed, may be taking advantage of a governmental programme for deserters or have been captured (the fewest). Thousands of paramilitaries have also been disbanded. Cultivation of drugs has increased, but so has safety in the cities. Control of the main roads has improved, and it has led to an important increase of foreign investments and economic growth.

Some years ago, the government set out a successful programme encouraging Colombians to drive over some roads that were especially guarded by the army. It spread a shared feeling of safety and encouraged the idea of Colombians recovering territory which used to be too dangerous to travel around.

The international face of this optimistic movement is Ingrid Betancourt, a Colombian politician who was rescued after seven years kidnapped by FARC. Media coverage of her case raised unprecedented interest and solidarity with the victims of guerrilla kidnappings inside and outside Colombia. Kidnapping was focused on then as a main damage caused by the conflict. Big demonstrations were planned in many countries demanding the release of the victims and the disbanding of FARC. Betancourt became the icon of Colombian suffering caused by guerrillas. Her case and some other information made the world proud of Democratic Security and showed Uribe as the firm leader of the people finally managing to reach Colombian peace.

However, this optimism and support is not at all as unanimous as it may seem from abroad. Inside Colombian society, there is a strong contrasting vision about the conflict with a belief that even if the Democratic Security Strategy had some success in terms of security, it disregards some important aspects and factors of the complex phenomenon of Colombian violence. Citizens are far from accepting it as a fight between democracy and drug trafficking/terrorism.

The first of these disregarded aspects is the role of the state. As a consequence of several decades hearing about corruption, state abuses and partisan fights, people live in a general atmosphere of mistrust and rejection of politics. The government of Uribe, of course, is not an exception. Drug trafficking and hard corruption is considered to be extended everywhere -especially in the political spheres.

Corruption surrounding the government was confirmed in 2006 when the “Parapolitics” scandal revealed that 11 deputies from the coalition that supports Uribe and some governors close to the president had decisive links and business with important paramilitary leaders. Paramilitary groups have carried out some of the most unbelievably sadistic attacks and massacres in the last four decades which affected mainly the poorest villages in the countryside. Union members and politicians from the left have also been victims. Paramilitaries are illegal and have been out of control since 1989, but they have been treated with significant permissiveness and understanding by the state.

All these obscure links discredit the government from its pretended role of neutral embodiment of democracy and Colombian peace. That’s why one of the main demands of the opposition is the official recognition of the legal status of “internal conflict”. It is an international law concept in the frame of the war conventions of Geneva whose recognition would establish some clear limits and rules for the actors, especially for the state. According to the opposition, the legal definition of internal conflict fits perfectly with the situation and is more realistic than the drug trafficking/terrorism approach defended by Uribe, as the army and guerrillas are holding a confrontation that goes beyond the terrorism and police methods.

For this alternative paradigm, defining the conflict in terms of terrorism may allow disregard of the deep socio-political causes of violence and leave the way open for restrictions in the application of basic rights and international humanitarian law. In the last years, new powers have been conferred to the army, the intelligence agency (DAS) has carried out a heavy control and the number of arbitrary arrests has increased on behalf of the Human Rights Observatory. The most horrible kind of corruption was also carried out, caused by the pressure of the government over the army seeking objective results and the rewards offered to civilians revealing information. Many innocent youngsters have been murdered by the army and presented as fallen guerrilleros. Two hundred cases have been admitted and another 1,000 are being investigated, including some previous cases to Uribe’s mandate. Some important officers in the army were dismissed, but no political responsibility has been admitted and no change has been introduced in the security strategy.

According to the growing opposition, the legal recognition of the conflict would establish a clear legal frame for negotiation. They believe that definitive military victory is impossible and it is time for a parallel search for political solutions. The first step would mean exchanging prisoners (especially those kidnapped by FARC) and then maybe dealing for a “negotiated political solution” of the conflict. The negotiations that have led to the last kidnapping releases were brought about by members of the opposition, outside of the frame of Democratic Security, under the reluctant permission of Uribe.

Even if political negotiation with FARC wasn’t feasible, in the second paradigm, it’s considered that no solution will be found without a comprehensive approach facing all the aspects and causes of violence. It implies working for a more integrated society and a more open and legitimate state. To understand the conflict, it’s important to remember the exclusion and extreme social inequalities in Colombian society. That’s why the opposition considers that militarization can’t avoid undertaking deep social reforms that could start erasing the harsh exclusion and the deep-rooted violence. There is, in Colombia, a fear towards the state as an instrument that tends to defend the ruling class’ interests. In the opposition paradigm, more left-oriented than Uribe, Democratic Security is seen as “elitist”, which is a somehow usual criticism about Colombian state. In fact, several important businessmen and high military officers participated, drawing up the documents of the programme and so selecting the security priorities and, of course, the means, risks and harms.

For all these reasons, the recent demonstrations against FARC kidnapping, promoted by Betancourt and supported by the government had clear Uribe-ist implications. Many people didn’t attend, or did so with some reservation, claiming for a wider approach to the conflict.

Another consequence of Democratic Security approach is that, in the supposed war of the whole Colombian society and democracy against terrorism, there is little space for political disagreement. The so-called “unanimism” has polarized positions and has made all the disagreeing opinions not only criticisms of the security strategy but a whole opposition paradigm, which is, however, not as concrete and clear as Democratic Security. The most structured version is present in the opposition parties in parliament but, in fact, it may also contain many different and complicated critical positions sharing some fundamentals and, of course, some widespread vague ideas which I have tried to expound here.

It isn’t confirmed whether Uribe will stand for the next presidential elections in 2010. Everything might change if he’s not standing. Eight years ago, Colombian people strongly voted for his “firm hand”. Today, the attitude seems to be changing. Opposition to Democratic Security is growing, but the popularity ratings of the president are still impressive.

Anyway, whichever of these two paradigms wins next year, the government will have to keep working hard to gain, on one hand, the effective control of the country and, on the other, to become the unanimously accepted reflection of justice and solidarity. The Colombian state has failed in both tasks during the last 30 years.